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Kant’s legal and political philosophy has often been viewed as his least im-
portant contribution, branded by the likes of Hannah Arendt as a work of 
his autumn years, and vastly overshadowed by his contributions to ethics, 
epistemology, and even aesthetics. The editors of this volume have sought 
to remedy that by showing that the renewal of interest in that part of Kant’s 
work, visible in the last two decades, is in fact justifi ed by the potential in-
herent in it. This collection of articles, addressing the topics of Kant’s legal 
and political magnum opus, his Doctrine of Right (published in 1797 as the 
fi rst part of The Metaphysics of Morals), has thus two main, interwoven am-
bitions. The fi rst is to show that his legal and political philosophy comprises 
a domain separate from his ethics, interesting and fruitful in its own right. 
The second is to suggest some of the ways in which that autonomous domain 
“might have real application[s] to the contemporary world” (Introduction, 1)
The twelve articles in the volume are obviously not intended to provide 
a comprehensive guide to the whole Doctrine of Right, but they manage to 
cover its main topics taken as potential contributions to contemporary de-
bates. These include the nature and the role of the social contract, the justi-
fi ability and content of human rights, the purpose of the state (especially in 
the context of debates about its role in the welfare of its citizens), the limits 
of political authority and obligation, international relations and, fi nally, in-
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terpersonal relations viewed with the benefi t of distinction between ethical 
and juridical domains. All of the important topics are addressed, although 
some are approached from unusual perspectives, which is defi nitely a con-
ceptual plus, because it adds to the argument of the fruitfulness of applying 
Kant’s insights to contemporary debates. Opposing views are also included, 
which Kant himself, as a staunch supporter of public intellectual debates, 
would surely have welcomed.
The opening chapter of the book is fi ttingly selected for its attempt to 
present Right as a domain independent of ethics, establishing it as a stand-
alone part of Kant’s moral philosophy. Concerned only with duties for which 
external lawgiving is possible, whose enforcement can be secured by law-
ful coercion, and thus only with external freedom, Right is clearly distin-
guished from ethical considerations, while at the same time included under 
the obligations dictated by practical reason. Starting with that demarca-
tion, Macarena Marey then continues by establishing the role of the social 
contract in Kant’s philosophy. It is used as a normative idea, intended to 
provide the justifi cation for the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of 
coercion, at the same time establishing the state as on obligatory end in 
itself, necessary for achieving external freedom and equality. It is not used 
to legitimize ethical norms, nor is it used in purely pragmatical reasoning, 
aimed at ends such as the maximization of happiness. Marey thus suggests 
that Kant’s purely juridical standpoint is a welcome addition to contempo-
rary debates concerning the nature and the role of the social contract, which 
have been revitalized ever since Rawls renewed the interest in the subject.
Addressing the same topic, Alice Pinheiro Walla aims to show that the 
social contract is not seen by Kant exclusively as a normative standard, nor 
as a useful heuristic principle. Instead, she claims that the united general 
will, seen as an entity established by the actual consent of all human be-
ings, is a real goal envisioned by Kant, necessitated by the need to establish 
legitimate private property claims. Without it, the use of external objects 
by fi nite rational beings can never be fully compatible with the external 
freedom of all, thus making all property rights prior to establishing a global 
(republican) political community merely provisional.
The interconnected topics of human rights and the purpose of the state 
take up a third of the book. In an attempt to show the way in which Kant’s 
insights might bring something new to the table, Eric Boot starts with the 
observation that in current liberal theories of human rights there is a ten-
dency to treat rights as a fundamental moral category, then used to develop 
the corresponding duties supposedly based on them. Kant’s approach turns 
things the other way around. Duty is the fundamental moral category, and 
rights are established only on the basis of those duties which Kant calls per-
fect duties. Their “perfection” stems from the fact that they prescribe with 
precision who owes what to whom, thus making the enforcement of them 
possible, in principle, by lawful coercion, which makes them juridical duties 
(the only exceptions being the duties not to lie, not to commit suicide and the 
duty of respect, which are perfect but concern internal motives, not external 
actions, thus making them the only perfect ethical duties). The upshot of 
Boot’s observation could be the potential to stop the hyper-infl ation (and 
the corresponding devaluation) of human rights. The downside, at least for 
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some, is the fact that Kant sees the duty of benefi cence as an imperfect duty, 
its imperfection stemming form its latitude, which does not prescribe with 
precision who owes what to whom, implying that there can be no such thing 
as a right to, for instance, a decent standard of living.
Picking up where Boot left off, Masataka Oki tackles the question of the 
purpose and the role of the state, pointing to the obvious fact that Kant does 
not see the state as an entity tasked with promoting the material well-being 
of its citizens. This point connects with Boot’s claim of the impossibility of 
establishing the normative foundations of the modern welfare state based 
on Kant’s legal and political philosophy. However, Oki claims that the func-
tioning of the Kantian state is internally connected with human happiness, 
but in a different way. Man, being the sensual, fi nite but also rational being 
that he is, requires freedom for his happiness. And human freedom, Kant 
claims, is only possible within the confi nes of a civil condition, in which the 
external freedom of all is made possible by universal laws, made by all (as 
lawgivers), and applied equally to all (as citizens).
Driving the point further, Nuria Sánchez Madrid acknowledges Kant’s 
claim that the state can and should tax the wealthy citizens to support those 
who are destitute, but points out that claims like that in no way support the 
reading of Kant as an advocate of the welfare state. Proceeding not from a 
supposed right to a decent standard of living, but from the state’s duty to 
preserve the civil condition (which might be endangered by internal strife, 
external aggression prompted by the state’s weakness, or simply by losing 
parts that make up the whole), she claims that these measures simply don’t 
equate to the current concept of poverty removal as a duty on national as 
well as global levels. Limited in their scope to the preservation of life, in 
Kant’s vision they do not include the removal of social inequality, which is 
seen as compatible with republican citizenship and equality before the law.
A dissenting voice on the topic can be heard from Larry Krasnoff, whose 
thesis is that the Doctrine of Right should be read as a rejection of the fa-
miliar difference between classical and welfare liberalism altogether. The 
supposed difference rests on the premise that law and freedom can be sepa-
rated. The so called classical liberals maintain that freedom predates law, 
which can then be seen as a potential threat to freedom, and that the state 
should be concerned only with the legal equality of its citizens, rejecting 
modern welfare programs as attacks on individual liberty. The so called 
welfare liberals maintain that law in a way creates freedom, making it con-
ditional, and enabling the state to pursue welfare programs after freedom 
has been secured; those programs are then legitimized by considerations 
other than political liberalism (usually by a version of utilitarianism). In the 
Doctrine of Right, on the other hand, Kant claims that (external) freedom 
and law are essentially connected. Freedom cannot be seen as predating 
positive law, nor can positive law be normatively conceptualized without 
the concept of mutual external freedom (thus it cannot be said that we start 
with positive law, and only then come to understand what freedom is). From 
there, Krasnoff builds up an argument that modern welfare programs can 
be legitimate from a liberal perspective, but not as contributions to some 
further goal beyond freedom (such as material well-being), but as freedom-
enabling devices, making individuals independent of the choice of others.
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A pair of articles in the mid-section of the book tackles Kant’s infamous 
claim that resistance to political authority can never be justifi ed, a claim 
based on the very logic of sovereignty, which precludes the possibility of 
legitimate public action bypassing the sovereign (and made worse by the 
usual interpretation that Kant considers all existing regimes as legitimate, 
no matter how far they stray from his proclaimed republican ideal). Wendy 
Brockie delivers an overview-style text, pointing to the key aspects of the 
topic (whether all regimes can be considered legitimate, passive vs. active 
resistance, the role of free speech in peaceful reform measures envisioned 
by Kant). Also pointing to some contemporary contributors to the debate, 
she concludes by observing that there seems to be no ground in the Doc-
trine of Right that can legitimize resistance to an abusive regime. Alyssa R. 
Bernstein offers an alternative take on the subject, pointing that there is 
room in Kant’s political philosophy for the claim that not every thug wield-
ing organized power must eo ipso be considered a sovereign, commanding 
respect in a civil condition. Contributing original content to the debate, she 
proceeds to describe a scenario in which there is even a Kantian basis for 
acts of civil disobedience in a legitimate civil condition, provided some very 
specifi c circumstances are in place.
On the other end of the popularity scale, Kant’s most beloved politically-
related claim, and arguably his most infl uential contribution to political 
philosophy to date, is his insistence that perpetual peace and global po-
litical community are to be considered the highest political good, and thus 
pursued as the obligatory fi nal end of politics. The two articles covering 
the subject here aim to avoid the head-on tackling of the obvious points of 
discussion, which have been extensively covered in the existing literature 
(a global state vs. a global confederacy; the question of legitimate means 
of establishing a global community). Approaching the subject of legitimate 
means from a different angle,  Milla Emilia Vaha points to an implication 
of Kant’s theory that modern liberal authors, inclined to draw inspiration 
from Kant, might not welcome. Observing their tendency to ascribe the full 
extent of rights in the international domain to liberal-democratic states 
only, she claims that Kant’s theory does not support such a view. Stemming 
from the moral personhood of the state, equal rights and duties belong to 
all states alike, even non-liberal ones (or, in Kant’s parlance, despotic ones, 
which nevertheless are full-blown states). A consequence of this approach 
is that liberal states cannot have a right to meddle in the internal affairs of 
non-liberal states (although the question of whether all coercion-enforcing 
regimes qualify as states remains open).
Sorin Baiasu makes his contribution to the topic even more original, 
approaching the question of the means from an epistemological perspec-
tive. Claiming that there are important differences between Kant’s highest 
ethical good and his highest political good (again delineating juridical and 
ethical domains of Kant’s moral philosophy), Baiasu sets out to differentiate 
their respective guarantees. Opting for the interpretation in which perpetu-
al peace is seen as secured by the outward workings of nature (irrespective 
of the internal human motives), Baisu points that its guarantee is then the 
object of a doctrinal belief, centered on the teleological picture of nature, as 
opposed to a different epistemic category, a moral belief in the postulates of 
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pure practical reason (god, freedom, immortality), which is needed for the 
possibility of attaining the highest ethical good.
Closing the volume are two articles that approach the topic of inter-
personal relations, suggesting some of the ways in which their ethical and 
juridical aspects should be delineated. Paula Satne tackles the question of 
punishment and forgiveness in Kant, elegantly bypassing Kant’s second 
most notorious legal claim, his endorsement of capital punishment. Instead, 
she focuses on the category of punishment in general, describing that an 
individual, in principle, cannot administer punishment for the wrongs done 
to him. Transgressions of positive law can only be punished by the state 
(because unilateral use of force can never be in accordance with right), while 
transgression of moral law can only be punished by god (the one who hands 
out happiness in proportion with one’s worthiness, which requires being 
able to see a person’s internal motives). On the other hand, forgiveness is a 
strictly ethical concept, playing an important role in a person’s moral devel-
opment, but having no place in the juridical domain. Forgiving a transgres-
sion of positive law would constitute a breach of the universal principle of 
right, by putting one person’s external freedom above another’s, even if the 
victims are willing to forgive the perpetrator who shows true remorse.
    Turning from vengeance to passion and lust, Jordan Pascoe tries 
to evaluate the potential contribution of Kant’s claims about marriage to 
contemporary debates about the purpose and accessibility of marriage in 
general. Originally conceived by Kant as a juridical solution to an ethical 
problem (how to enable sexual relations without at the same time debas-
ing persons by treating them as mere instruments of pleasure), marriage 
becomes a part of private right. It creates a special juridical domain, in 
which married persons share common ends and purposes, thus preclud-
ing them from treating each other as mere means for the gain of personal 
ends. At the same time, the existence of their common ends and purposes 
is acknowledged by the state, which is thus unable to distinguish between 
the partners, in turn giving them both equal standing before the law. Kant 
thus treats marriage in the same manner that he treats private property 
and contracts - he sees them as legal means that enable fi nite rational be-
ings to satisfy their natural needs in a way consistent with the dictates of 
pure practical reason. Pascoe claims that such a view on marriage has some 
potential to contribute to the contemporary marriage equality movement, 
but is not useful in more radical attempts to transform the very concept of 
marriage in the name of promoting social, economic and gender equality.
    In summary, the volume does achieve the goal of offering a peek into 
“what a political position grounded in the Doctrine of Right would look like 
in twenty-fi rst-century terms” (2). The twelve articles, obviously, do not of-
fer a comprehensive analysis of the whole Doctrine of Right, but nor were 
they supposed to. They do give the reader a taste of Kant’s main legal and 
political preoccupations, and suggest some of the ways in which his argu-
ments could be brought to bear on contemporary issues. Considering the na-
ture of the source material, a twelve-article volume could hardly be tasked 
with more than that.
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